update README.md

NixOS migration

README.md

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
         - 9009-9013/tcp (relay)
     - **SFTPGo**
         - 2022/tcp (SFTP)
+    - **Gitea**
+        - 2222/tcp (SSH)
     - **WireGuard Easy**
         - 51820/udp (WireGuard)
 
@@ -89,24 +91,9 @@ Launch all services with the following command:
 
 ### 6. Host Firewall Bouncer (CrowdSec, nftables)
 
-The Caddy bouncer protects HTTP services. Stalwart's mail ports (25/465/587/143/993/110/995/4190) bypass Caddy, so install a firewall bouncer on the host. CrowdSec packages live on PackageCloud, not in the default apt repos, so add the repo first:
+The Caddy bouncer protects HTTP services. Stalwart's mail ports (25/465/587/143/993/110/995/4190) bypass Caddy, so run a CrowdSec **firewall bouncer** on the host itself (nftables backend).
 
-```sh
-curl -s https://packagecloud.io/install/repositories/crowdsec/crowdsec/script.deb.sh | sudo bash
-sudo apt install crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables
-```
-
-Do NOT use `install.crowdsec.net` (that installs the engine too, which we already run in Docker).
-
-Patch the default config (the package writes `api_url: http://127.0.0.1:8080/` but our LAPI is on 18080):
-
-```sh
-FW_KEY=$(grep '^CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_KEY_FW=' ./crowdsec/.env | cut -d= -f2)
-sudo sed -i "s|^api_url:.*|api_url: http://127.0.0.1:18080/|" /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
-sudo sed -i "s|^api_key:.*|api_key: $FW_KEY|" /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
-sudo systemctl enable --now crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
-sudo systemctl status crowdsec-firewall-bouncer --no-pager
-```
+Configure it to talk to the engine's LAPI on `127.0.0.1:18080` (published by the crowdsec container) and give it an `api_key` equal to `CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_KEY_FW` from step 4. Do NOT install the CrowdSec engine on the host, it already runs in Docker. For installing and configuring the bouncer itself, see the official docs: https://docs.crowdsec.net/u/bouncers/firewall/ (repo: https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer).
 
 Verify:
 
@@ -117,30 +104,18 @@ sudo nft list ruleset | grep crowdsec         # kernel-level rules in place
 
 ## Backups (optional, restic)
 
-This is **optional** — use it only if you want off-site, encrypted backups of your service data. Here it is done with [restic](https://github.com/restic/restic) over SFTP (e.g. a Hetzner Storage Box). restic encrypts client-side, deduplicates and compresses, so no separate `tar`/`gzip` is needed. Run as **root**, since Docker-created service data is mostly root-owned.
+This is **optional**, use it only if you want off-site, encrypted backups of your service data. Here it is done with [restic](https://github.com/restic/restic) over SFTP (e.g. a Hetzner Storage Box). restic encrypts client-side, deduplicates and compresses, so no separate `tar`/`gzip` is needed. Run as **root**, since Docker-created service data is mostly root-owned.
 
-Replace the placeholders: `USER@HOST:PORT` (SFTP target), `/path/to/restic-repo` (repo path on the server), `YOUR_PASSWORD` (losing it means the backup is unrecoverable), `/path/to/services` (directory to back up). Do not commit real secrets to git.
+Installing restic and scheduling the backup depend on the host and are out of scope here. Replace the placeholders: `USER@HOST:PORT` (SFTP target), `/path/to/restic-repo` (repo path on the server), `YOUR_PASSWORD` (losing it means the backup is unrecoverable), `/path/to/services` (directory to back up). Do not commit real secrets to git.
 
 ```sh
-# 1. Install restic and set up passwordless SSH to the target (as root)
-sudo apt install restic
-sudo -i
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 && ssh-copy-id -p PORT USER@HOST   # no passphrase
-
-# 2. Backup script: /usr/local/bin/restic-backup.sh  (chmod 700)
-#!/bin/bash
 export RESTIC_REPOSITORY="sftp://USER@HOST:PORT//path/to/restic-repo"   # note the double slash before an absolute path
 export RESTIC_PASSWORD="YOUR_PASSWORD"
+
+restic init                                    # once
 restic backup /path/to/services --compression max
-restic forget --keep-last 3 --prune                       # keep only the 3 newest snapshots
-
-# 3. Initialize once, then test
-restic init
-/usr/local/bin/restic-backup.sh && restic snapshots
-
-# 4. Schedule via cron (3x/day at 06:00, 14:00, 22:00)
-sudo crontab -e
-# 0 6,14,22 * * * /usr/local/bin/restic-backup.sh >> /var/log/restic-backup.log 2>&1
+restic forget --keep-last 3 --prune            # keep only the 3 newest snapshots
+restic snapshots
 ```
 
 Restore (from any machine with restic + repo access + password, as root):

crowdsec/acquis.d/sshd.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 source: journalctl
 journalctl_filter:
-  - "_SYSTEMD_UNIT=ssh.service"
+  # NixOS names the OpenSSH unit "sshd.service"; Debian/Ubuntu use "ssh.service".
+  - "_SYSTEMD_UNIT=sshd.service"
 labels:
   type: syslog

gitea/.env.example

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 # URL of the Gitea instance
 GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea:3000
+# Domain advertised in SSH clone URLs (e.g. gitea.aykhans.me)
+GITEA_SSH_DOMAIN=
 # How to get the token: https://docs.gitea.com/usage/actions/act-runner#obtain-a-registration-token
 GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN=
 # UID and GID of the user that should run the runner (e.g. USER_UID=1000, USER_GID=1000)

gitea/docker-compose.yaml

@@ -15,10 +15,14 @@ services:
     environment:
       - USER_UID=${USER_UID}
       - USER_GID=${USER_GID}
+      - GITEA__server__SSH_DOMAIN=${GITEA_SSH_DOMAIN}
+      - GITEA__server__SSH_PORT=2222
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks:
       - gitea
       - caddy
+    ports:
+      - "2222:22"
     volumes:
       - ./data:/data
       - /etc/timezone:/etc/timezone:ro

main.sh

@@ -70,7 +70,31 @@ generate_env_files() {
     print_success ".env files generated."
 }
 
+# Some containers run as a fixed non-root uid and bind-mount their data from
+# this repo. A fresh `git clone` (or a non-root restore) leaves that data owned
+# by the cloning user, so those services can't write to it. Docker does not
+# chown bind mounts, so reset ownership to each container's uid before starting.
+# Add a line here whenever a new service pins a non-root `user:`.
+fix_permissions() {
+    echo "Fixing data ownership for fixed-uid services..."
+    # Only services that run as a fixed non-root uid AND write to a bind-mounted
+    # data dir need this. Root containers write fine; images like mysql/gitea
+    # chown their own data via a root entrypoint; grafana/prometheus here only
+    # read config or use no writable bind mount, so they are intentionally absent.
+    sudo chown -R 1001:1001 ./stalwart/data   # stalwart: compose user "1001:1001"
+    sudo chown -R 1000:1000 ./sftpgo/data     # sftpgo:   image default user 1000
+}
+
 start_services() {
+    fix_permissions
+
+    # Ensure ~/.docker/config.json is a FILE before any container mounts it.
+    # watchtower bind-mounts it; if it is missing, the Docker daemon creates it
+    # as a root-owned directory, which then breaks every docker CLI call.
+    mkdir -p ~/.docker
+    [ -d ~/.docker/config.json ] && sudo rmdir ~/.docker/config.json
+    [ -f ~/.docker/config.json ] || echo '{}' > ~/.docker/config.json
+
     docker network create caddy 2>/dev/null
     docker network create grafana 2>/dev/null
     docker network create gitea 2>/dev/null

prometheus/docker-compose.yaml

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ services:
       - -housekeeping_interval=3s
       - -storage_duration=2m
       - -docker_only
+      - -containerd=/var/run/docker/containerd/containerd.sock
     logging:
       driver: "json-file"
       options: